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Abstract—Cooperation between neighboring vehicles is an
effective solution to the problem of malicious node identification
in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). However, the outcome
is subject to nodes’ beliefs and reactions in the collaboration.
In this paper, a plain game-theoretic approach that captures the
uncertainty of nodes about their monitoring systems, the type of
their neighboring nodes, and the outcome of the cooperation is
proposed. In particular, one stage of a local voting-based scheme
(game) for identifying a target node is developed using a Bayesian
game. In this context, incentives are offered in expected utilities
of nodes in order to promote cooperation in the network. The
proposed model is then analyzed to obtain equilibrium points,
ensuring that no node can improve its utility by changing its
strategy. Finally, the behavior of malicious and benign nodes is
studied by extensive simulation results. Specifically, it is shown
how the existing uncertainties and the designed incentives impact
the strategies of the players and, consequently, the correct target-
node identification.
Index Terms—Misbehavior detection, local voting-based
scheme, game theory, uncertainty, VANETs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The high priority of security in intelligent transportation
systems has led many researchers to identify security gaps in
modern vehicles [1]–[3]. An important challenge is to detect
malicious nodes in vehicular networks, where connections are
short-lived (ephemeral), and centrally managed stations are
(sometimes) absent. In such transitory distributed networks,
quick cooperation among neighboring nodes can provide effec-
tive solutions. However, nodes are usually selfish and reluctant
to cooperate for no benefit. In addition, each node has some
inherent uncertainties in a collaboration, including the type of
participants, the accuracy of its own components (e.g., detec-
tion system), and attainable outcomes, all of which affect the
node’s decision about whether to participate. Therefore, it is
crucial to provide incentives according to different reactions of
nodes under uncertainty to achieve malicious node detection.
Scholars have realized the effect of misbehaving nodes
in the network, and put forward many control and security
schemes to mitigate their impact [4]–[10]. Revocation process
is an effective approach for malicious nodes detections that
captures the dynamic nature of vehicular ad hoc networks
(VANETs) [4], [5]. In this process, a benign node is assumed
to detect (or get suspicious of) a malicious node and broadcasts
its identification (ID) as a target (or an accused) node. Then,
other benign neighbors run the voting approach to discredit
the target node, while considering their own best interests. In
this line of work, Kim [7] developed a weighted voting-based
decision scheme on the basis of cluster architecture to discredit
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malicious nodes in mobile ad hoc networks. Alabdel et al. [8]
proposed an evolutionary game model in which all benign
nodes take part in the voting game, focusing on unsuccessful
revocation and over-reacted revocation decisions. Masdari [10]
introduced a collaborative false accusation approach to stop
wrong accusations in the network.
Despite valuable efforts in the literature, the study of
incentive-based voting games that capture the inherent un-
certainties of nodes for malicious-node identification is still
incomplete. In this regard, some points should be emphasized.
First, the type of target node could be either malicious or
benign, because every node (including malicious nodes) can
accuse the others. A node can use a detection system to
monitor its neighbors, but the accuracy and cost of monitoring
should be counted in the game. Second, benign nodes are
uncertain about the strategy of malicious nodes. For instance,
a malicious node might intentionally not attack a benign
node in order to obtain its support during a voting game.
Third, incentives should only encourage knowledgeable nodes
(i.e., nodes that have already monitored the target node)
in cooperating. Otherwise, the incentives will lead to many
random votes in the game, which might spoil the result of
cooperation. Fourth, both benign nodes and malicious nodes
can take part in the voting game. This implies that a benign
node cannot rely solely on others’ votes, owing to misleading
votes from malicious nodes. Finally, the cost of group in the
game (a.k.a. social cost) should be designed based on nodes’
contributions and their uncertainties about the results. For
example, a cooperative node should be punished less than an
abstaining node when the collaboration becomes unsuccessful.
Considering the above points, we study misbehavior detec-
tion using the local voting game in the presence of uncertainty.
Our main contributions in this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• We develop one stage of a local voting game using a plain
Bayesian game. We capture the uncertainties of a node
w.r.t. its detection system, the type of the target node, and
strategies of other players in the game. In addition, we
consider incentives in expected utilities (payoffs) of players
to encourage nodes to cooperate.
• We analyze the proposed model using a mixed-strategy BNE
to obtain the equilibrium points of the game. Our findings
reveal the best strategies that can be adopted by attackers
and benign players w.r.t. the game parameters. Specifically,
we ensure that no node can improve its utility by changing
its strategy.
• We provide extensive numerical results to verify the analysis
and investigate the impact of cooperation parameters on the
identification of malicious nodes. Our results confirm the
influence of the designed incentives, hence participation rate,
on the strategies of malicious and benign nodes. We observe,
in particular, that if the participation incentives go beyond a
certain limit, then correct target-node identification will be
decreased, in spite of the growing participation rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes assumptions, the local voting game, and the
objectives of this paper. Section III formulates the game that
includes defining parameters, payoff design, and a variable
benefit scheme in the game. Section IV applies Bayesian game
analysis to derive equilibrium points in the proposed model.
Section V is devoted to the numerical results. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. Network Model
We study misbehavior detection in a VANET where nodes
have short-lived connections, and a centrally managed station
is absent. We assume that nodes (i.e., vehicles) are powerful
enough to have wireless communication among themselves.
We also assume that nodes have the same range of communi-
cations. We consider a contention-based medium, e.g., IEEE
802.11p in a VANET, that can represent the sequential nature
of wireless channel access [4]. We further assume that a base
station or a certificate authority has already established the
credential of nodes, hence each node has a unique ID.
We presume that there are two types of nodes in the
network: malicious and benign. Malicious nodes may attack
benign nodes by disseminating false information. For example,
a malicious car might inject faulty data to the sensors of
the car that follows it, in order to manipulate an optimal
space between them [11]. On the other hand, a benign node
is equipped with a monitoring system to detect abnormal
or counterfeit signals. For example, an autonomous vehicle
can use a set of anti-spoofing techniques to detect fake GPS
signals [12]. However, benign nodes do not necessarily need
to monitor all of their neighbors due to the cost of monitoring
over all short-lived connections.
B. Local Voting Game
We assume that nodes can participate in a local voting game
in order to determine the identity of a node in the network.
The voting game starts when an initiator broadcasts the ID of
a target node. Then, neighboring nodes choose either to vote
or not to vote (abstain) on the type of the target node. Each
node calculates its costs and benefits to choose a strategy. The
nodes broadcast their decisions sequentially, and each node’s
decision is made in one stage of the game. We assume that the
belief of a node w.r.t. the target node is independently inferred
and does not change (e.g., by other votes) during the game. We
presume that the target node is identified when the number of
votes in one type (either malicious or benign) reaches a pre-
defined number. This number is denoted by nth. If correct
(wrong) votes reach nth, then we will have correct (wrong)
target node identification. If nth is not reached during the
game, then we will have undecided target node identification.
Malicious nodes and benign nodes can choose some strate-
gies in the game. A malicious node could select to attack
or not to attack a benign node. On the other hand, a benign
node might or might not use its detection system to monitor
its neighbors. After a target node is determined, a benign
node checks whether it has already monitored the target node.
If it has not monitored the target node, then it will abstain
from voting, simply because it does not have any information
about the node. But, if the benign node has monitored the
target node, then it calculates its payoffs. If its voting payoff
outweighs its abstaining payoff, then the benign node will
vote; otherwise, it will abstain. On the other hand, malicious
nodes always vote against a benign target node and for a
malicious target node. We do not consider strategic malicious
nodes that can optimize their types of votes to collect some
credits, or send multiple wrong votes (Sybil attack [13]).
C. Problem Definition
We assume that malicious nodes are aware of an existing
voting game in the network. The objective of a malicious node
is to maximize the level of its aggressiveness in the network
without being identified. However, it is uncertain about the
probability of being monitored by a benign node, the accuracy
of a monitoring system, and the strategy of a benign node
in the game (i.e., voting or abstaining). In contrast, a benign
node knows that some of its neighbors may be malicious. The
objective of a benign node is to choose a strategy with the aim
of target node identification. However, a benign node has some
limitations in its monitoring system. Also, it is uncertain about
the strategies of malicious nodes. Therefore, it is uncertain
about the type of the target node. Taking these points into
consideration, our goal is the following:
• To design payoffs for a benign node w.r.t. the explained
uncertainties and the value of its contribution in the game,
• To determine the best strategies for malicious nodes and
benign nodes.
We address the first problem in section IV by considering
the following: (i) the vote of a benign node that could be either
correct or incorrect; (ii) the probability of correct target node
identification in each stage, which is mainly based on the votes
that have already been cast; and (iii) the impact of a benign
node’s strategy on correct, wrong, and undecided target node
identification. We address the second problem in section V. In
particular, we develop one stage of the voting game using a
Bayesian game to study the reactions of a benign node w.r.t.
a benign or malicious target node. This helps us understand
the best strategies of both types of nodes in the network.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first define parameters of the game. Then,
we focus on designing payoffs based on individual and group
beliefs of players.
A. Parameters
For our analysis, we need to define some parameters, as
listed in Table I. To begin, we assume that a benign node
holds an asset with a security value of w, where w > 0. A
malicious node could compromise the asset by paying the cost
of an attack, denoted by ca. In contrast, a benign node protects
its asset by monitoring for attacks, with probability Pm. This
monitoring costs cm for the node, and all costs are positive. It
TABLE I: List of parameters in alphabetical order.
Meaning
α
β
pk
w
cm
ca
cv
b
cgm
cgb
nv1
nv2
nth
Symbols
Probability of detection (true positive)
Probability of false alarm (false positive)
Value of an asset
Cost of attack
Cost of voting
n Total number of nodes
Probability of monitoringPm
Probability of successful group identification
nl
nr
Payoffs for a benign playera
t
µ
Cost of monitoring of an asset
Benefit
−b Punishment
Prior probability of node being malicious
Cost of group for incorrect identification of
benign target node
malicious target node
Cost of group for incorrect identification of
Number of nodes left at kth stage
Number of required votes at kth stage to identify target node
Number of required votes to identify target node
Number of correct votes for target node
Number of incorrect votes for target node
at k
th
stage
Payoffs for target node
q
s
Probability of attack for malicious PLT
Probability of voting for monitoring PLB
is sensible to assume that w > ca and w > cm. Otherwise, the
attacker and the benign node lose their motivations to attack
and protect the asset, respectively. A benign node assigns a
prior probability of µ for its neighbors to be malicious. The
monitoring system of a benign node can detect an abnormality
with probability α (i.e., true positive rate), while it suffers from
a false alarm (i.e., false positive rate) with probability β. It is
rational to expect that α > 0.5 > β.
It is assumed that n nodes are in a neighboring area. Each
benign node can vote by paying cv as the cost of voting.
The benefit of a correct strategy and the punishment of an
incorrect strategy for a benign node are denoted by b and −b,
respectively. It is assumed that b > cv > 0, which means that
the benefit of a correct strategy (either voting or abstaining)
is more than its cost. To generalize the analysis, we design
the game at the kth stage, in which the type of a target node
has not yet been determined. It is assumed that nv1 correct
votes and nv2 wrong votes have already been cast before the
kth stage of the game. In this stage, there are nl nodes left in
the game. We let nr denote the number of remaining votes
required to identify the target node. We use pk to denote
probability of correct target node identification at the kth stage.
It is assumed that the cost of the group (neighboring nodes)
for the incorrect identification of a malicious target node and
a benign target node are cgm and cgb, respectively. Equipped
with these parameters, we design the expected payoffs for
players in the game.
B. Payoff Design
In this section, we study players’ payoffs at the kth stage
of the game, where the target node has not yet been identified.
Fig. 1 shows payoffs in the game, where rows and columns
indicate the strategies of a target node and a benign player,
Attack
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Vote Abstain
Attack
Benign Node, 1
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(1 (1
Attack
Not
Attack
Vote Abstain
Not
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target node
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(a)
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(a7, 0) (Pma8 + (1− Pm)a9, 0)
PLB
PLT
Fig. 1: Players’ Payoffs in the game relative to (a) malicious
target node, and (b) benign target node.
respectively. Hereafter, the target node and benign player are
denoted by PLT and PLB, respectively. The first element in
each window refers to the PLB and the second element refers
to the PLT. Here, azs refer to payoffs for PLB, and tzs refer
to payoffs for PLT, where 1 ≤ z ≤ 9. It is assumed that
tz = 0 for 4 ≤ z ≤ 9, because a non-attacking PLT does not
gain or lose in the game. We define each player’s payoff as the
summation of an individual payoff and a group payoff. That is,
az = az,i+az,g and tz = tz,i+tz,g, where az,i and tz,i denote
individual payoffs, and az,g and tz,g denote group payoffs.
The individual payoff only considers interactions between two
players. In contrast, the group payoff accounts for the impact
of a player’s strategy on all members in the neighborhood.
The PLT could have either attacked or not attacked a PLB,
depending on its type and strategy. Three scenarios could have
happened between PLT and PLB: (i) malicious PLT attacked
PLB, (ii) malicious PLT did not attack PLB, and (iii) PLT
is benign. The PLB at the kth stage of the game, however,
chooses its voting or abstaining strategy based on what it
has observed before kth stage and what it might achieve in
the game. In what follows, we comprehensively study how to
obtain payoffs in scenario I. Payoffs for scenarios II and III
can be derived in the same fashion.
The first row in Fig. 1(a) pertains to scenario I (i.e.,
malicious PLT attacked PLB). Here, we are interested in
obtaining azs and tzs, where 1 ≤ z ≤ 3. The subscripts z = 1
and z = 2 refer to the payoffs of a monitoring PLB, and
z = 3 refers to the payoffs of a non-monitoring PLB. To obtain
a1,i and a2,i, note that a monitoring PLB pays −cm as the
cost of monitoring. Also, a monitoring PLB gains (2α− 1)w
(i.e., αw − (1 − α)w)) from its detection system, which
includes the impact of detection rate (α) and false negative
rate (1−α). Thus, we have a1,i = a2,i = −cm+(2α−1)w. In
addition, PLT’s attack compromises a non-monitoring PLB’s
asset, i.e. a3,i = −w. On the other hand, PLT pays −ca
as the cost of the attack. If PLB is in a monitoring state,
then the loss of PLT can be assumed as the negative gain of
PLB’s individual payoff [14], i.e. −(2α − 1)w. Hence, we
have t1,i = t2,i = −ca − (2α− 1)w. However, if PLB is in a
non-monitoring state, then PLT gains w from its attack, i.e.,
t3,i = −ca + w.
To design a2,g and a3,g, the voting payoff and the abstaining
payoff of a monitoring PLB are studied w.r.t. the probability
of correct target node identification (pk). This is because
the target node is not yet identified at the kth stage of the
game, and hence correct, wrong, or undecided target node
Vote Abstain
pkb− cv 0 −cv
−cv − cgm
−(1− pk)b
pkb
−cgm
(a) (b)
−cv − cgb
(c)
pkb− cv 0
−(1− pk)b
−cgm
−(1− pk)b
−cgb
−cv − cgm
Vote Abstain
Vote Abstain
pk
1− pk
pk
1− pk
Fig. 2: Group Payoffs for three scenarios: (a) malicious target
node has attacked a monitoring benign node, (b) malicious
target node has not attacked a monitoring benign node, (c)
benign target node versus a monitoring benign node.
identification may happen. Fig. 2(a) shows the strategies of
a monitoring PLB at the kth stage relative to pk. The left
column corresponds to the player’s voting payoff (i.e., a1,g),
and the right column refers to its abstaining payoff ( i.e., a2,g).
Here, −cv and 0 represent the cost of voting and abstaining,
respectively. Also, −cgm in the lower row denotes the cost of
incorrect identification of a malicious target node. In addition,
the reward of voting in correct target identification (top left
window) and the punishment of abstaining in incorrect target
identification (bottom right window) are represented by bpk
and −b(1 − pk), respectively. These are proportional to pk
because the player’s expected outcome is entangled with the
probability of correct target node identification in the middle
of the game. The reward and the punishment are considered
(as incentives) to encourage nodes in cooperation.
Fig. 3 shows payoffs for PLB for different pks, in which
cv = 1, b = 1.5, and cgm = 2. As can be seen, voting payoffs
and abstaining payoffs outweigh each other, depending on the
value of pk. For instance, voting payoffs are dominant for
pk < 0.2, and thereby the player votes in this interval. In this
case, voting can be interpreted as an attempt from the player
to increase pk and avoid an incorrect outcome of the game.
The main motivation of the player, however, comes from the
punishment of the game. In other words, the cost of voting is
lower than the punishment of the game when the malicious
target node is not correctly identified (lower row of Fig. 2(a)).
That is, if pk → 0, then −cv > −(1 − pk)b. Thus, the player
votes not only to increase pk but also to avoid punishment.
Using above individual payoffs and group payoffs in Fig.
2(a), we can compute payoffs in this scenario.
Lemma 1. az and tz , where 1 ≤ z ≤ 3, are as follows:
a1 = p
2
kb− cv − (1− pk)cgm − cm + (2α− 1)w, (1)
a2 = −(1− pk)
2b− (1− pk)cgm − cm + (2α− 1)w, (2)
a3 = −w − (1 − pk)cgm, (3)
t1 = t2 = −ca − (2α− 1)w + (1 − pk)cgm, (4)
t3 = −ca + w + (1− pk)cgm. (5)
All lemmas and theorems are proved in the appendix.
For the second and third scenarios, we use Fig. 2(b) and Fig.
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Fig. 3: Payoffs for monitoring benign node relative to pk.
2(c) respectively to obtain group payoffs. Applying a similar
reasoning of scenario I to scenarios II and III yields the rest
of the payoffs as follows:
a4 = −(1− pk)
2b− cv − (1− pk)cgm − cm − βw, (6)
a5 = p
2
kb− (1− pk)cgm − cm − βw, (7)
a6 = −(1− pk)cgm, (8)
a7 = p
2
kb− cv − (1− pk)cgb − cm − βw, (9)
a8 = −(1− pk)
2b− (1− pk)cgb − cm − βw, (10)
a9 = −(1− pk)cgb. (11)
As seen in equations (1)-(11), pk plays an important role in
the payoffs. Thus, we obtain pk to evaluate the strategies of
players. It is noteworthy that the value of pk increases when
PLB votes correctly. This improvement in pk is denoted by δ.
Lemma 2. pk and δ can be obtained as follows:
pk =
nl∑
i=nr
(
nl
i
) (
ps
)i (
1− ps
)nl−i, (12)
δ =
(
nl
nr − 1
) (
ps
)nr−1 (
1− ps
)nl−(nr−1), (13)
where ps represents the probability of correct target identifi-
cation by remaining nodes in the game.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
The objective of the players is to maximize their payoffs
in the game. In this regard, we obtain possible equilibrium
points using a Bayesian game to better understand the behavior
of the players. In particular, we obtain the best strategies of
benign players to identify a malicious node, while we find
the maximum level of aggressiveness for malicious nodes
without being identified. In this respect, we use the interactions
between a PLB and a PLT, as illustrated in Fig. 1. To obtain
equilibrium points, we use a mixed-strategy BNE because
the game is a finite strategic-form game. To determine each
player’s indifference strategy, we define q as the probability of
attack for a malicious PLT, and s as the probability of voting
for a monitoring PLB.
Theorem 1. Given µ and Pm, the game defined in section III
has a mixed-strategy BNE, which is as follows:
• Malicious node attacks with a probability of q∗, which is
q
∗ =
q1 + q2 + ...+ qn
n
, (14)
where qk, is the probability of attack for the k
th node
qk =
Ak
Bk
, (15)
Ak = µ
(
1 + Pm
)(
2p2k − 2pk + 1
)
b+
(
1− Pm
)
×
(
cm + βw
)
+ cv − p
2
kb− Pm
(
1− pk
)
2
b,
Bk = µ
(
1 + Pm
)(
2p2k − 2pk + 1
)
b+ µ
(
1− Pm
)
(2α+ β)w.
• Monitoring benign node votes with probability of s∗,
which is equal to
s
∗ =
ca + (2αPm − 1)w − cgm
(1− Pm)[−ca + (1− 2α)w + cgm]− δcgm
. (16)
Note that the mixed-strategy provides general equilibrium
points w.r.t. different parameters. In a special case, if all nodes
monitor their neighbors, i.e. Pm = 1, then one can derive an
upper bound for the benefit and a lower bound for the detection
rate using eqs. (15) and (16), respectively.
Corollary 1. In Theorem 2, if Pm = 1, then we have
b <
cv
(1− 2µ)(2p2k − 2pk + 1)
, (17)
α >
w − ca + cgm(1− δ)
2w
. (18)
From eq. (17), we observe that as µ → 12 , the upper bound
increases. This allows network designers to select higher
values of benefit in an environments where the probability of
malicious PLT is higher. On the other hand, eq. (18) implies
that a monitoring system must have a minimum true positive
rate in order to make a malicious node indifferent in the game.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To evaluate our analysis, we assume that 40 nodes run
the game in an area of 625 m × 625 m (normal density
≈ 100 nodes
km2
in [15]). Since the analysis is probabilistic, we run
100 iterations for each simulation. Then, we take an average
of the results with 95% confidence interval. The default game
parameters are as follows:
• Monitoring system parameters: α = 0.95, β = 0.05,
• Probabilities: Pm = 0.75, µ = 0.2, and q = 0.4,
• Costs and benefits: cgb = cgm = 4, w = 4 > b = 3 >
cm = ca = cv = 1.
If we change these parameters to better explain a scenario,
then we will explicitly mention it. We describe the results in
three subsections. Initially, we study the impact of incentives
(in particular, b) on correct, wrong, and undecided target node
identification. Then, we focus on the behavior of malicious
nodes w.r.t. their portion and aggressiveness in the network.
Finally, we compare our work with scenarios where the
uncertainties discussed in this paper have not been considered,
e.g., [5], [8], [10].
A. Impact of incentives
Fig. 4 illustrates the percentage of target node identification
versus b. Here, it is assumed that q = 0.7. As shown, this
figure can be categorized into four different regions. In region
I, the percentage of undecided target identification outweighs
correct and wrong identifications for a simple reason: the
benefit is not large enough to persuade nodes to participate
in the game. Region II, however, illustrates a drastic reduction
of undecided identification. This indicates that voting payoffs
become larger in comparison to abstaining payoffs. In addition,
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correct identification dominates over wrong identification,
which is the result of the following: (i) benign nodes with
high monitoring and detection rates (i.e., Pm = 0.75 and
α = 0.95), and (ii) malicious nodes with a high level of
aggressiveness (i.e., q = 0.7). Region III shows a slight
increase in correct identification and a decrease in undecided
identification because of lower payoffs for abstaining from the
game. The increase of wrong identification over undecided
identification is remarkable in region IV. Wrong votes in this
region mainly come from highly encouraged benign nodes
that have not been attacked by a malicious target node. In
other words, since voting payoffs are significantly larger than
abstaining payoffs (i.e., a4 > a5 and a7 > a8), a benign
node votes in favor of a non-attacking target node. This
observation reveals that persuading every node to vote by
applying the leverage of benefit does not necessarily lead to a
better outcome. Taking all regions into consideration, region
III indicates the best option for the benefit design.
B. Impact of malicious nodes
Fig. 5 shows the percentage of target identification w.r.t. the
portion of malicious nodes and their probability of attack (q) in
the network. As shown, when q increases, correct identification
generally increases, which confirms that aggressive attackers
can be identified easier. However, wrong identification is
reduced after a certain value of q; for example, q = 0.1 for
µ = 0.1. When the number of malicious nodes increases in
the network, this decreasing trend starts at higher values of q;
for instance, q = 0.4 for µ = 0.2. This reveals that malicious
nodes become more aggressive when their number increases.
C. Comparison
In this section, we compare our work with the scenarios
where some of the explained uncertainties have not been
considered (e.g. [5], [8], [10]). It is worth mentioning that
the comparison is limited to highlighting uncertainties in those
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Fig. 6: Impact of uncertainties in game in relation to: (a) detection
rate, and (b) correct identification rate.
scenarios. This is because the nature of their games and objec-
tives are slightly different. However, this comparison provides
us with insights into the impact of imperfect information at
nodes on the outcome of a local voting game.
Fig. 6(a) shows the impact of the true positive detection
rate (α) on the correct target identification. As can be seen, it
is essential for nodes to have high values of α to gain high
correct target identification. The value of α becomes more
important when fewer benign nodes monitor their neighbors
(i.e., smaller Pm). Fig. 6(b) indicates a comparison between a
design with and without uncertainties in the local voting game.
In particular, we assume that a design without uncertainty has
the following parameters: α = 1, β = 0, and q = 1. As shown,
the difference between graphs is growing with µ. This is
because a player without uncertainty considers a non-attacking
malicious node as a benign node and votes for it. Our proposed
design, on the other hand, prevents benign nodes from voting
when they are unsure about the strategy of malicious nodes.
Moreover, in both cases, when µ goes beyond a threshold,
here 0.3, correct identification is significantly reduced. This
comes from higher payoffs for abstaining in comparison to
voting. Interpreted differently, benign nodes are unwilling to
cooperate in a game that a high portion of participants are
malicious.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a game-theoretic approach
to identify malicious nodes in VANETs, where central stations
are not available. In particular, we have studied the strategies
of nodes in a local voting-based game using a Bayesian
game, in which nodes have incomplete information about the
accuracy of their monitoring systems, the type of neighbors
(benign or malicious), and the outcome of the game. By
offering incentives in expected utilities, we have provided
encouragements for game participation with the aim of im-
proving correct node identification. We have derived a mixed-
strategy BNE points to study the best strategies of players in
the game. Simulation results showed the impact of different
parameters such as participation benefits and detection rate on
identification of malicious nodes.
VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. In Fig. 2(a), the left column (vote) refers to a1,g, and
the right column (abstain) refers to a2,g . Since each strategy
(voting or abstaining) has two identification possibilities, de-
noted by pk and 1− pk, the payoff of each strategy should be
weighted by corresponding probabilities. In other words,
a1,g = pk ×
(
pkb− cv
)
+
(
1− pk
)
×
(
− cv − cgm
)
,
⇒ a1,g = p
2
kb− cv − (1− pk)cgm, (19)
a2,g = pk ×
(
0
)
+
(
1− pk
)
×
(
− (1 − pk)b − cgm
)
,
⇒ a2,g = −(1− pk)
2b− (1− pk)cgm. (20)
If we add individual payoffs a1,i = a2,i = −cm+(2α−1)w
to eqs. (19) and (20), we obtain eqs. (1) and (2), respectively.
Eq. (3) can be obtained by adding a3,i to a3,g. To have a3,g,
we know that non-monitoring PLB abstains from the game,
so it completely relies on other nodes for the group payoff.
Thus, we define a3,g = −(1 − pk)cgm, where the node does
not impact the group decision. If pk = 1, then the node is not
harmed, but if pk = 0, then it gets −cgm. The summation of
a3,i and a3,g yields eq. (3).
On the other hand, to obtain PLT’s payoffs, we need to
have PLT’s group payoff. tk,gs for 1 ≤ k ≤ 3 can be ex-
pressed as (1−pk)cgm, which reflects the inverse proportional
relationship between pk and the gain of malicious PLT. The
summation of individual payoffs and (1 − pk)cgm ( as group
payoff) yields eqs. (4) and(5)
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. To obtain pk, note that nv1 and nv2 votes have already
been cast until the kth stage, while there are nl nodes left in
the game. To derive a closed form for pk, note the following:
(i) If nr > nl, then pk = 0, which means that the number of
left nodes is less than the number of required votes to identify
PLT; (ii) if nr = 0, then pk = 1, which implies that PLT has
been already identified; (iii) pk directly depends on nl and
their type; and (iv) if nr is reduced, then pk will be increased.
Taking these points into account, pk can be written in the form
of eq. (12), where ps represents the probability of correct target
node identification. For instance, assume n = 10, k = 7 (i.e.,
nl = 3), ps = 1/3, and nth = 4. Under such assumptions,
if nv1 = 0 (i.e., nr = 4), then equation (12) yields pk = 0
because of the first condition. If nv1 = 4 (i.e., nr = 0), then
eq. (12) yields pk = 1 because of the second condition. Also,
substituting nr = 1 and nr = 3, respectively, yields pk =
0.7 and pk ≈ 0.04, which confirm the last condition. It is
noteworthy that ps ∝ λ(1 − µ)αPm, where λ represents the
probability of remaining nodes to be in the network.
Since δ is defined as the difference that a correct vote can
make in pk, we have δ = pk(voting)− pk(abstaining). That is
⇒ δ =
nl∑
i=nr−1
(
nl
i
) (
ps
)i (
1− ps
)nl−i
−
nl∑
i=nr
(
nl
i
) (
ps
)i (
1− ps
)nl−i, (21)
which yields eq. (13).
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. To obtain q∗, we first equalize the expected utilities for
voting and abstaining to obtain qk. Then, we take an average
over all possible values of the pks to get eq. (14). In this way,
we have the followings:
Eu
[
voting
]
= Eu
[
abstaining
]
(22)
where,
Eu
[
voting
]
= µqa1 + µ
(
1− q
)
a4 +
(
1− µ
)
a7, (23)
Eu
[
abstaining
]
= µ q Pma2 + µ q
(
1− Pm
)
a3 + µ
(
1−
q
)
Pma5 + µ
(
1− q
)(
1− Pm
)
a6 +
(
1−
µ
)
Pma8 +
(
1− µ
)(
1− Pm
)
a9. (24)
Substituting eqs. (1), (6), and (9) into eq. (23), and eqs. (2), (3),
(7), (8), (10), and (11) into eq. (24), and then substituting eqs.
(23) and (24) in eq. (22) yields eq. (15). Since the malicious
PLT might attack the neighboring nodes regardless of their
stage in the game, we take an average over all values of qks,
which yields eq. (14).
To calculate s∗, we can equalize the expected utilities of
attack and not attack from PLT, hence, obtaining
µ s t1 + Pm µ (1− s) t2 + (1− Pm)µ t3 = 0. (25)
Plugging eqs. (4) and (5) back into eq. (25) yields eq. (16).
REFERENCES
[1] J. Petit and S. E. Shladover, “Potential cyberattacks on automated
vehicles„” IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems,
vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 546–556, 2015.
[2] S. Parkinson, P. Ward, K. Wilson, and J. Miller, “Cyber threats facing
autonomous and connected vehicles: Future challenges,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 18, no. 11, pp. 2898–
2915, 2017.
[3] R. W. van der Heijden, S. Dietzel, T. Leinmüller, and F. Kargl, “Sur-
vey on misbehavior detection in cooperative intelligent transportation
systems,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 2018.
[4] M. Raya, M. H. Manshaei, M. Félegyházi, and J.-P. Hubaux, “Revoca-
tion games in ephemeral networks,” in Proceedings of the 15th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Alexandria,
VA, USA, October 2008, pp. 199–210.
[5] I. Bilogrevic, M. H. Manshaei, M. Raya, and J.-P. Hubaux, “Optimal
revocations in ephemeral networks: A game-theoretic framework,” in
Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Modeling and Op-
timization in Mobile Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), Avignon,
France, May–June 2010, pp. 21–30.
[6] M. Ghanavati, A. Chakravarthy, and P. P. Menon, “Analysis of auto-
motive cyber-attacks on highways using partial differential equation
models,” IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, vol. 5,
no. 4, pp. 1775–1786, 2018.
[7] S. Kim, “Effective certificate revocation scheme based on weighted
voting game approach,” IET Information Security, vol. 10, no. 4, pp.
180–187, 2016.
[8] A. A. A. Abass, N. B. Mandayam, and Z. Gajic, “An evolutionary game
model for threat revocation in ephemeral networks,” in 51st Annual
Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), Baltimore,
MD, USA, 2017, pp. 1–5.
[9] K. K. Chidella, A. Asaduzzaman, and F. Mashhadi, “Prior detection
of explosives to defeat tragic attacks using knowledge based sensor
networks,” in 2017 Ninth Annual IEEE Green Technologies Conference
(GreenTech). IEEE, 2017, pp. 283–289.
[10] M. Masdari, “Towards secure localized certificate revocation in mobile
ad-hoc networks,” IETE Tech. Rev., vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 561–571, 2017.
[11] A. Ferdowsi, U. Challita, W. Saad, and N. B. Mandayam, “Robust deep
reinforcement learning for security and safety in autonomous vehicle
systems,” in 21st International Conference on Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITSC), Nov. 2018, pp. 307–312.
[12] A. Behfarnia and A. Eslami, “Risk assessment of autonomous vehicles
using bayesian defense graphs,” in IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology
Conference (VTC-Fall), Aug. 2018, pp. 1–5.
[13] B. Yu, C.-Z. Xu, and B. Xiao, “Detecting sybil attacks in vanets,”
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, vol. 73, no. 6, pp. 746–
756, 2013.
[14] Y. Liu, C. Comaniciu, and H. Man, “Modelling misbehaviour in ad hoc
networks: A game theoretic approach for intrusion detection,” Journal
of Security and Networks, vol. 1, no. 3-4, pp. 243–254, 2006.
[15] J. A. Sanguesa, F. Naranjo, V. Torres-Sanz, M. Fogue, P. Garrido,
and F. J. Martinez, “On the study of vehicle density in intelligent
transportation systems,” Mobile Information Systems, vol. 2016, ID
8320756, 2016.
